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   1 
Introduction  
  The interdependence between Mexico and the United States increased when these 
two countries ratified the North American Free Trade Agreement on January 1, 1994.  With the 
advent of NAFTA, tariffs on many agricultural products were lowered or are in the process of 
being lowered by 2009.  Corn is a commodity for which Mexico has until 2009 to completely 
eliminate its tariff.  Until then, Mexico uses a tariff-rate quota which is divided among the 
various Mexican corn importers through import permits called “cupos”.   
  Josling (1997), states that free trade is the absence of deliberate tariff barriers, non-tariff 
barriers such as quotas, and any discriminatory policy against imported goods.  However, he 
goes on to state that governments are unlikely to allow such an ideal situation to arise.  Mexico 
uses an administrative trade barrier (import permit) to protect its producers from U.S. corn 
imports deliberately inhibiting the trade flow between the two countries.  The issuance of these 
import permits is a highly political process in which different lobbying groups put pressure on 
the Mexican government to either issue import permits or stop the issuance of import permits.   
  In this study a structural model of international marketing margins for an agricultural 
commodity and trade uncertainty is developed that links behavioral processes from the private 
market to political factors influencing administrative trade barriers.  In doing so, this 
systematically links trade models specified by Gallagher (1998) and, which characterize private 
markets under uncertainty but ignore direct influences from political markets, to work by Trefler 
(1993),Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and Grossman and Helpman (1994), which focus 
on endogenous trade protection.  In other words, instead of modeling trade uncertainty induced 
in part by political processes in a purely probabilistic manner, the behavioral processes that 
determine the likelihood of trade are identified using concepts of trade protection and public   2 
choice analysis.  The intent is that a trade model with endogenous protection can help better 
explain uncertainty in trade of agricultural commodities between Mexico and the U.S.   
Background Information 
  Many barriers to free trade can be attributed to the political process.  In their 1995 article, 
Grossman and Helpman added that politically motivated governments tilt negotiations in trade 
talks with other governments toward their most organized interest groups.  This can be seen 
clearly in the NAFTA negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico concerning the sugar and corn 
policies.  Tariff rates will reflect the strength of both the domestic and foreign interest groups.  
Protection will be particularly high when the domestic interest group is strong and the foreign 
interest group is weak, in relative strength in each country.  An example is the corn agreement 
between the U.S. and Mexico, where Mexico administers a tariff rate quota where the amount of 
the quota increases until the tariff is completely abolished in 2009.  It is assumed that exporter 
interest groups in the U.S. have more relative strength than producer groups in Mexico by the 
outcome of this agreement. 
There have been few models that have empirically tested the effect of trade uncertainty 
on agricultural trade especially due to technical barriers to trade.  Many models such as the one 
by Gallagher (1998) are theoretical in nature.  Those that are empirical in nature seem to be 
concerned with changes in tariff rates or quotas and not technical or administrative barriers.  
Roberts and DeRemer (1997) and Ndayisenga and Kinsey (1994) have written case studies 
regarding technical barriers to trade.  Roberts and DeRemer give an overview of the technical 
trade barriers encounters in agricultural trade and describe the challenges faced when trying to 
establish the costs and benefits of these barriers as opposed to the traditional trade barriers.    3 
Ndayisenga and Kinsey (1994) studied the cause of growth of non-tariff trade measures on 
agricultural products.  
In his article Pick (1990), analyzes the effects of exchange rate risk on U.S. agricultural 
exports to ten different countries including Mexico.  Pick assumes that the demand for imports is 
a derived demand, where the imports are used in the domestic production of the final goods.   
He found that exchange rate risk did have an adverse affect on U.S. agricultural exports to 
Mexico.   
In contrast, Gallagher (1998) considered marketing margins and trade determination in 
the presence of trade uncertainty due to administrative trade barriers.  Where administrative 
(technical) trade barriers are classified as licenses, health restrictions, exchange rate risk, and 
import classifications, or any import procedure that appears or disappears when market 
conditions change.   
Therefore, by combining politics, uncertainty, and administrative trade barriers the 
current study is adding to the lack of literature concerning technical barriers to trade.  The 
Mexican corn import license is a combination of all of these trade barriers.  Politicians decide to 
whom and when the licenses are issued.  The uncertainty caused by these arbitrary decisions 
according to the literature should have an adverse affect on U.S. exports to Mexico, thereby 
increasing import price and decreasing export quantity. 
Mexican Agricultural Policy under NAFTA 
  The Mexican government’s policy on trade has changed significantly in the last 20 years.  
Before NAFTA, Mexico followed a policy of import substitution and severe import restrictions.  
With the advent of NAFTA, Mexico shifted to a more open economy by opening its borders (in a 
cautious way) to foreign imports.   4 
Trade Policy 
With NAFTA, tariffs on many agricultural products were lowered.  Although corn will 
have restricted access into the Mexican market until 2009, with Mexico having to allow an 
increasing amount of corn into the country every two years from ratification (Josling 1997).   
The Mexican government controls agricultural imports through licensing requirements, tariffs, 
and export duties (Smith 1984; Mielke 1984).  Although the overall controls are determined by a 
committee of public and private officials, issuance of import licenses is done by the Secretariat 
of Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI) and none are issued until the domestic crop 
has been purchased (Mielke 1989).  The Mexican government’s aim of using import licenses is 
to avoid displacing domestic production.  One of the main problems of this licensing policy and 
the basis of this study is that the terms of the import license are subject to change without notice, 
thereby adding uncertainty to the trade flow of white corn between the U.S. and Mexico. 
Despite the economic cost, the political price of an open border policy in corn would be 
excessive because of its central role as a subsistence crop for most of Mexico’s peasants.  
Although, ending government intervention in the market would affect all consumers it may 
disproportionately affect the poor.  According to Garcia (1990) tortillas and flour may be 
subsidized by as much as 40 percent.  Small tortilla shops sell to low-income consumers and 
supply 60 percent of the market while industrial tortilla producers sell to high-income consumers 
in urban areas. 
Interest Groups 
Several groups have been on opposing sides for the liberalization of the corn market.  
Since the ratification of NAFTA in 1994, these groups can be placed into two general categories,   5 
those opposing the issuance of import permits because of fear that corn imports will damage 
domestic producers and those for the issuance of import permits because of a need for low cost 
inputs of consistent quality.  The different groups that have been historically for and against 
import permits can be characterized as three distinct groups: (1) producer groups and peasant 
associations, (2) industrial processors, and (3) sugar manufacturers. 
Beginning with producer groups, they have historically been against the issuance of 
import permits as they regard lower priced U.S. corn as a rival in their market.  It has been 
shown that completely liberalizing a commodity market does have a detrimental affect on 
Mexican producers.  For example, Bivings (1997) showed that the liberalization of the sorghum 
market in Mexico hurt Mexican producers who could not compete with U.S. sorghum imports.  
The Mexican government did not re-instate import permits in this case but did put in place 
seasonal tariffs on imports, domestic price controls, and a storage subsidy scheme (Bivings 
1997).  Therefore, producers are very wary of U.S. imports.  However, Mexico as stated 
previously is a net importer of corn so the government has not choice but to allow imports 
(especially after its became a member of NAFTA).  In its effort to appease the producers the 
government has tried to institute a policy of not issuing permits during the domestic harvest in an 
attempt to avoid displacing domestic production and keeping prices high.   
Second, producer groups have continuously protested the issuance of import permits and 
the distribution of those permits.  Producer groups led by the Consejo Agrario Permanente 
(CAP), have lobbied for the inclusion of producers in the decision making process for when, 
how, and how many import permits will be issued.  They have continually protested that 
SECOFI and the Cupo (import permit) Committee have always consulted with industrial groups   6 
but leave producers out of the process.  The import permit committee is made up of SECOFI 
officials, industry representatives, and CONASUPO. 
The group more consistently consulted about import permits has been the industrial users 
of corn.  This group includes the livestock industry, the industrial producers of tortillas, the corn 
flour industry, and the starch industry.  These groups have historically lobbied for import permits 
to be issued in a consistent manner.  Of the four industrial groups mentioned the starch industry 
is the group that always gets their import permits issued.  The starch industry includes large 
companies such as Almidones Mexicanos (ALMEX) that have ties to companies in the U.S such 
as Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) and A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company.  The 
starch industry is the only industry to be issued import permits consistently, quarter after quarter.  
This may be because it usually imports yellow corn and is not a direct competitor in the white 
corn market.  Another heavy hitter in this group is Gruma, which has a 70% share of the corn 
flour market in Mexico.  Gruma is also a 22% owner of ADM. 
The third group that has historically expressed an interest in corn import permits is the 
sugar group.  One industry in the sugar group consists of manufactures of high fructose corn 
syrup (HFCS) in Mexico, which normally lobby for corn import permits.  Another industry that 
is part of the sugar group is sugar producers in Mexico that normally lobby against import 
permits.  Sugar manufactures in Mexico have claimed that the NAFTA negotiations worked 
against them since the U.S. restricts sugar imports and although sugar imports will increase they 
do so only if the Mexican demand for sugar increases (including demand for HFCS) but Mexico 
has an obligation to increase its corn imports significantly.  They claim that not only is their 
export market restricted but also a low cost competitor has entered their market (Mena 1997).    7 
Devadoss, Kropf, and Wahl (1995) concur that the establishment of a corn sweetener market and 
the substitution of HFCS for sugar in Mexico will decrease Mexican sugar consumption. Like 
the industrial manufacturers of corn tortillas, the manufacturers of corn sweetener, and HFCS 
lobby for the issuance of import permits.  They claim that in order to compete in the market they 
must be allowed to import high quality low-cost inputs that include corn. 
Linking Political and Private Markets 
This section proceeds systematically by first conceptualizing a trade protection model.  
Then, the trade model is extended by recognizing the simultaneous relationships between import 
demand and trade protection in Mexico.   
Market for Trade Protection  
The Mexican government’s aim of using import permits is to avoid displacing domestic 
production (Personal interviews; Mielke 1989; Garcia 1990).  Therefore, the issuance of import 
permits is a highly political process.  The concept of endogenous protection is discussed and 
used to link political market factors to the structural trade equilibrium model through the import 
demand functions.  
For illustrative purposes consider isolating a simple market model of trade protection for 
the ith commodity (i = w for white corn, y for yellow corn, and s for sorghum).  This can be 
conceptualized as an equilibrium model in the form: 
(1)  ( , )
dd d
EPi EPi EPi EPi Qf P Z =  
(2)  ( , )
ss s
EPi EPi EPi EPi Qf P Z =  
(3) 
ds
EPi EPi EPi Q QQ ==   8 
Here, 
d
EPi Q  is the quantity demanded of protection for the ith commodity, 
s
EPi Q  is the quantity 
supplied of protection,  EPi P  is the price of protection, and   ()
ds
EPi EPi ZZ is a matrix of exogenous 
factors of demand (supply).  The last equation (3) is a simple market clearing condition. 
  In the case above the Mexican government is the supplier of protection from corn and 
sorghum imports.  Its use of corn import permit to avoid displacing domestic production 
demonstrates how it provides protection to its producers.  The demanders of import protection 
are the peasant associations, producer groups, and sugar manufacturers.  However, there is 
another group that has a vested interest in this market.  This group can be called the industrial 
users of corn and is made up primarily by the starch industry, tortilla industry, livestock industry, 
corn flour industry, and cereal industry.  The industrial users of corn lobby to have import 
permits issued in a consistent and timely manner.  Domestic producers of corn and sugar, lobby 
for import permits not to be issued at all and especially not during harvest.  Meanwhile, the 
Mexican government is trying to maximize its political support by placating both groups.   
  From the equilibrium model of trade protection, it is possible to employ the implicit 
function theorem (under appropriate conditions) to solve the system for the endogenous variables 
in terms of the exogenous variables.  This yields the reduced form equations for  EPi Q  and EPi P : 
(4)  ( , )
ds
EPi q EPi EPi Qh Z Z =  
(5)  ( , )
ds
EPi p EPi EPi Ph Z Z =  
Equation (4) is the reduced form equation for quantity of trade protection and equation (5) is the 
reduced form equation for the price of trade protection. 
  We hypothesize that quantity and price of protection are a function exogenous factors 
such as macroeconomic, political, and production variables.  An example of a political variable   9 
that can affect the level of protection is producer pressure on government officials to halt the 
issuance of import permits.  As pressure from producer associations in Mexico increases, the 
level of protection will increase as the number of import permits issued decreases.  In contrast, 
Mexican importers lobby to get import permits issued in a timely and consistent manner.  
Historically importers have had more influence on SECOFI since they were normally consulted 
when plans for import permits were being made.  Therefore, one would expect that as pressure 
from importers mounts the level of protection decreases as the amount of import permits 
increases.     
Protection and Import Demand Models 
The concept of endogenous protection hypothesizes that markets of imports are 
simultaneously determined with markets for trade protection (see Magee, Brock, and Young 
1989; Trefler 1993; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000).  Under this assumption, a generalized 
simultaneous equation model of import demands can be defined as follows: 
(6)  () () ( , , , )  for  , ,
d
ii i i i i Q gP Z i w ry r sr == PQ  
where  () () , i i PQ are right hand side endogenous protection variables.  In equation (6) the quantity 
demanded of the ith import commodity is a function of the endogenous import variables, 
endogenous protection variables, and exogenous variables.  Similarly, each demand and supply 
function of protection for the ith commodity could be re-specified to be simultaneously 
determined with quantity demanded and prices of imports.  In this manner, the level of trade 
protection is not treated as given.  Rather, as Trefler (1993) states “the theory of endogenous 
protection predicts that in response to increased import competition, private domestic interests   10 
will intensify their lobby activity for protection: higher levels of import penetration will lead to 
greater protection.”  
  Figure 1 shows the link between the import market and the market for trade protection.  
As the demand for protection increases in Panel A, the protection market, due, for example, to an 
increase in the lobbying efforts by corn producers in Mexico, there is an increase in the quantity 
of protection.  This increase in the quantity of protection causes less import permits to be issued, 
that is, it causes a leftward shift in import supply.  This decrease in import supply results in a 
decrease in the quantity imported and an increase in the import price.  
  In Mexico, the Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI) issues the 
import license permits through a Tariff Commission (import permit committee).  The import 
permit committee is made up government officials and industry leaders.  The government in 
order to avoid displacing domestic production does not begin issuing import permits until the 
domestic crop has been purchased (Mielke 1989).  The Mexican government identifies the 
industries that will need to import corn and ensures that they buy domestic corn.  In order for 
these firms to be assured an import permit they must participate in the domestic market.  In other 
words, they must buy a certain amount of domestic corn in order to be assured of getting an 
import permit and for that import permit to be for a desired amount.   
Linking Import Demand to Trade Protection 
  Because the quantity and price of trade protection are not observable for Mexican corn 
and sorghum, the reduced form equations will become useful in linking import demand equations 
to political market variables.  Zellner (1970) and Goldberger (1972) both discuss simultaneous 
equation models where endogenous dependent variables are not observable.  Zellner points out,   11 
that functional relationships containing unobservable variables can be compensated by using an 
instrumental variable approach.  As a result, substituting the reduced form relationships from the 
trade protection market into the simultaneous import demand equations in equation (6) yields: 
(7)  ( ,,,, )
d
wrw r w r y r s r p w r Q gP P P Z = Z  
(8)   ( ,,,,)
d
yry r y r w r s r p y r Q gPPP Z = Z  
(9)  ( ,,,,)
d
sr s rs rw ry r ps r Q gPPP Z = Z  
where the  p Z  are exogenous factors influencing trade protection.  The specification in equations 
(7)-(9) indicates that import quantities are functions of endogenous prices and quantities, as well 
as political and other exogenous variables.  Econometric issues associated with estimating these 
equations are discussed in later. 
  As stated previously, the factors hypothesized to influence the quantity of Mexican trade 
protection include macroeconomic variables, political factors, and production variables.  
Macroeconomic variables could be exchange rates, political factors could be producer pressure 
on government officials, and production variables could be domestic yield.   
Data  
  The data were collected from various sources, including the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s (USDA) Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS) and the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations.  Data was collected monthly from 1994 to 2000.  
Table 1 and Table 2 contain definitions of data variables for and the descriptive statistics 
respectively.    
  The quantity of white corn, yellow corn, and sorghum inspected for export to Mexico per 
month from 1994 to 2000 was obtained from United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),   12 
Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS).  All grain exported from the U.S. must be inspected by 
the Federal Grain Inspection Service of the USDA and the inspections are done when the grain is 
loaded on either the vessel or the railcar.  FGIS keeps a record of all commodities inspected for 
export by U.S. region and destination in metric tons.  Therefore, if no inspections of white corn, 
yellow corn, or sorghum took place in a certain month then those grains were not exported 
during that month.   
  The yellow corn data demonstrates that there are few months were yellow corn is not 
inspected for export.  In fact the only two months when yellow corn inspection did not take place 
were January and February 1994.  Those months however, coincide with a higher quantity of 
sorghum being inspected for export to Mexico.  It seems that there is an inverse relationship 
between sorghum and yellow corn inspections.  
  There are many months that the quantity of white corn export inspections is zero.  That is, 
no export inspection of white corn took place during those months, i.e. no white corn was 
exported during those months.  It seems that the period when quantity inspected is at its highest 
is during the later part of the year (July to December) for all three commodities. 
  Total U.S. monthly exports to Mexico, which include agricultural and nonagricultural 
goods, were obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce.  The export variables should also 
capture other reasons why exports would not occur such as currency devaluations and exchange 
rates.  Total exports from the U.S. to Mexico can indicate the import penetration of U.S. products 
into Mexico.  This variable shows an increasing trend for the period between January 1994 and 
December 2000 with the exception of 1995.  Total exports exhibited a downward trend in 1995 
when Mexico suffered another economic crisis and peso devaluation.     13 
  Articles in the medial concerning the use and allocation of import permits were collected 
from Lexis-Nexis and the USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS).  These articles are used as 
a proxy for producer pressure to stop the use of import permits and therefore halt duty-free 
imports similar to methods used by The articles are from the period between 1994 and 2000 and 
range from having no articles in one month to having several in another month.  The articles in 
the media include Mexican government officials discussing the use of import permits with the 
Secretariat of Agriculture, producer groups protesting imports at the border, and producer 
associations protesting the allocation of import permits.   Most of the negative articles were 
referencing corn and sorghum producers pressuring the government to halt grain imports.  Some 
articles also dealt with sugar producers unhappy with corn imports coming into the country duty-
free. 
  Import permit allocations were obtained from FAS from 1994 to 2000.  The allocations 
tell the quantity that each industry received in each quarter.  If an import permit was issued to an 
industry for a certain quarter a 1 was placed for all three months in that quarter and 0 otherwise.  
The industries to which corn import permits are allocated are the starch industry, the livestock 
industry, the cereal industry, the corn flour industry, the tortilla industry, and CONASUPO. 
  The cash prices in U.S. dollars for yellow corn and sorghum were obtained from National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), USDA.  Cash prices were obtained on a monthly basis 
from January 1994 to December 2000.   
  The cash price for white corn was obtained from Chris Morely from Global Risk 
Management Corporation (GMRC).  However, the GMRC data for white corn was not complete 
and only covered the period from September 1997 to April 2000.  This three year data set was in   14 
daily terms so the average for each month was used.  In order to have a complete data set for 
white corn, yellow corn cash price was used to estimate white corn cash price using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and the results are shown in Table 3.  Two other OLS models were 
estimated, which also had the lagged yellow corn cash price and the corn futures price added as 
regressors, but those models showed no improvement from just having the present yellow corn 
cash price.  The estimated values for white corn were then used for the missing values.  The 
nominal daily exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Mexican peso was obtained from 
the Bank of Canada.  The daily values were then averaged for the each month for the period from 
January 1994 to December 2000.   
  The trend in the cash prices for white corn, yellow corn, and sorghum is shown in Figure 
2.  The prices for white corn and sorghum follow very closely the trend in the yellow corn price.  
This is to be expected since white corn and sorghum are traded off yellow corn.  This trend is 
shown in Figure 2 where the white corn price is consistently higher and the sorghum price lower, 
respectively from the yellow corn price.   
  Data for monthly corn and sorghum imports was obtained from FGIS for the period 
between January 1994 and December 2000 in metric tons and shown in Figure 3.  One can see 
that when sorghum imports are high yellow corn import are low and vice versa.  There are very 
few months were imports of yellow corn or sorghum did not take place.   However, there are 
many months especially before July 1998 that imports of white corn did not take place.  The 
times when imports of white corn did not take place coincides with decreased allocation of 
import permits to white corn importing industries such as the tortilla industry.     15 
Empirical Analysis   
 Import  demand  equations were derived by conceptualizing a restricted normalized 
quadratic profit function and by following Diewert and Morrison’s (1986) approach.  The 
Mexican import demand models are estimated simultaneously with the demand for protection 
using an instrumental variables approach used by Zellner (1970), when estimating regression 
relationships with unobservable independent variables.  Import demand is linked to trade 
protection by specifying equations (7)-(9).  The import demand equations were estimated using a 
simultaneous tobit model with monthly data from January 1994 and December 2000.  Goodwin 
and Featherstone (1995) and others have used simultaneous tobit models in the agricultural 
economics literature.   
Specifying the Import Demand Model 
  Consider, for example, the white corn import demand model represented in equation (10) 
which is a function of quantity of yellow corn imported (
d
yr Q ), quantity of sorghum imported 
(
d
sr Q ), the quantity of import protection ( EPw Q ), exogenous variables associated with the import 
demand of white corn Xwr, price of white corn() wr P , price of yellow corn() yr P , price of sorghum 
() sr P , and an error term  wr e : 
(10)  123 4 56 7
ddd
wr yr sr EPw wr wr yr sr wr Q QQQ X PPP e βββ β βββ =++ + ++++  
Equations (11-13) represent reduced form functions of the import demand for yellow corn, 
import demand for sorghum, and quantity of import protection for white corn, respectively:    
(11) 
d
yry r y r y r Q v α =Π + 
(12) 
d
sr sr sr sr Q v α =Π +   16 
(13)  EPw EPw EPw EPw Q v α =Π + 
  As stated previously the quantity of import protection for white corn is not observable, 
therefore the reduced form relationships in equation (13) are substituted into equation (10). 
(10’)  12 3 5 67 8 ()
ddd
wry rs r E P w E P ww r w r y r s r w r Q QQ X PPP u ββ β α β βββ =++ Π + +++ +  
where, uwr=bvEPw+ewr.  In effect this is analogous to Theil’s (1971) approach to achieving 
consistent estimates for two stage least squares, which is a reduced form representation of the 
structural form model in equation (10).  A limitation of this process of dealing with unobservable 
independent variables is the inability to identify  EPw α  from  3 β  in the estimation process, since 
the quantity of import protection is not known.  However, the model still yields consistent 
estimates of 3 () EPw βα , which are particularly valuable for prediction and simulation purposes.  
The above white corn model, as well as the models for yellow corn and sorghum are explicitly 
expressed in the next section. 
  In order to determine if the quantities of white corn, yellow corn, and sorghum are jointly 
determined a test for exogeneity in a simultaneous equation tobit model is performed using the 
approach by Smith and Blundell (1986).  First, three separate OLS regressions are performed for 
white corn, yellow corn and sorghum inspections.  The residuals of these regressions are then 
used in the tobit models for in the respective commodities.   
  A t-test can be used to test the single null hypothesis Ho:b=0.  We reject the null 
hypothesis of weak exogeneity if the coefficient on the residual ˆ
w EP v , an estimate of b, is 
significantly different from zero.  This t-test is preformed for the simultaneous models for white 
corn, yellow corn, and sorghum.   17 
Import Demand Models with Endogenous Protection 
  The import demand models with endogenous protection are specified from the conceptual 
models.  The import demand for white corn, yellow corn, and sorghum are specified in equations 
(14) – (16), respectively.  The equations estimated for white corn import demand are as follows:   
 (14)  
*
12 34 5 1 2
ddd













Where, the parameters to be estimated are β, γ, and τ.  The variables 
d
yri Q   and 
d
sri Q   denote 
import quantities of yellow corn and sorghum, respectively. The variable Zwri is a matrix of 
import protection variables and the variable Xwri is a matrix of exogenous variables associated 
with the import demand of white corn.  The variable Xwri1 is a linear trend variable and Xwri2 is a 
quadratic trend variable.  A quadratic time trend is used because with the implementation of 
NAFTA imports increased rapidly in 1994 and 1995 and then began to plateau beginning in 
1998. The variable Xwri3 is total import demand in Mexico for agricultural and non-agricultural 
products; Xwri4 and Xwri5 denote the Mexican production of corn and sorghum, respectively; and 
Xwri6 is the constant.  Further, Pwri is the U.S. cash price for white corn, Pyri is the U.S. cash price 
for yellow corn, Psri is the U.S. cash price for sorghum.   U.S. cash prices are used because the 
import price for corn and sorghum in Mexico is based on the futures price of the Chicago Board 
of Trade and are multiplied by the exchange rate. 
 The  variable  Zwri1 denotes the news on producer pressure and Zwri2 - Zwri7 denote industry 
allocations of import permits starting with the corn flour industry, the tortilla industry, the starch 
industry, the livestock industry, CONASUPO, and the cereal industry.  Lagged variables for   18 
protection are also added.  It is assumed that having an import permit last month will have an 
effect on import demand for this month.  Therefore, Zwri8 is lagged producer pressure, Zwri9 is 
lagged import permit allocation to the livestock industry, Zwri10 is lagged import permit allocation 
to the cereal industry, Zwri11 is lagged import permit allocation to the corn flour industry, Zwri12 is 
lagged import permit allocation to CONASUPO, Zwri13 is lagged import permit allocation to the 
tortilla industry, and Zwri14 is lagged import permit allocation to the starch industry.   
  The equations estimated for the import demand for yellow corn are as follows: 
(15) 
*
12 3 4 5 1 2
ddd













Where, the parameters to be estimated are β, γ, and τ.  The variables 
d
wri Q   and 
d
sri Q   denote 
import quantities of yellow corn and sorghum, respectively. The variable Zwri is a matrix of 
import protection variables and the variable Xwri is a matrix of exogenous variables associated 
with the import demand of white corn.  Further, Pwri is the U.S. cash price for white corn, Pyri is 
the U.S. cash price for yellow corn, Psri is the U.S. cash price for sorghum.   U.S. cash prices are 
used because the import price for corn and sorghum in Mexico is based on the futures price of 
the Chicago Board of Trade and are multiplied by the exchange rate.   
 The  variable  Xwri1 is a linear trend variable and Xwri2 is a quadratic trend variable.  A 
quadratic time trend is used because with the implementation of NAFTA imports increased 
rapidly in 1994 and 1995 and then began to plateau beginning in 1998. The variable Xwri3 is total 
import demand in Mexico for agricultural and non-agricultural products; Xwri4 and Xwri5 denote 
the Mexican production of corn and sorghum, respectively; and Xwri6 is the constant.     19 
 The  variable  Zwri1 denotes the news on producer pressure and Zwri2 - Zwri7 denote industry 
allocations of import permits starting with the corn flour industry, the tortilla industry, the starch 
industry, the livestock industry, CONASUPO, and the cereal industry.  Lagged variables for 
protection are also added.  It is assumed that having an import permit last month will have an 
effect on import demand for this month.  Therefore, Zwri8 is lagged producer pressure, Zwri9 is 
lagged import permit allocation to the livestock industry, Zwri10 is lagged import permit allocation 
to the cereal industry, Zwri11 is lagged import permit allocation to the corn flour industry, Zwri12 is 
lagged import permit allocation to CONASUPO, Zwri13 is lagged import permit allocation to the 
tortilla industry, and Zwri14 is lagged import permit allocation to the starch industry    
  The equations estimated for the import demand for sorghum are as follows:  
(16)  
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Where, the parameters to be estimated are β, γ, and τ.  The variables 
d
wri Q   and 
d
yri Q   denote 
import quantities of yellow corn and sorghum, respectively. The variable Zwri is a matrix of 
import protection variables and the variable Xwri is a matrix of exogenous variables associated 
with the import demand of white corn.  Further, Pwri is the U.S. cash price for white corn, Pyri is 
the U.S. cash price for yellow corn, Psri is the U.S. cash price for sorghum.   U.S. cash prices are 
used because the import price for corn and sorghum in Mexico is based on the futures price of 
the Chicago Board of Trade and are multiplied by the exchange rate.   
 The  variable  Xwri1 is a linear trend variable and Xwri2 is a quadratic trend variable.  A 
quadratic time trend is used because with the implementation of NAFTA imports increased   20 
rapidly in 1994 and 1995 and then began to plateau beginning in 1998. The variable Xwri3 is total 
import demand in Mexico for agricultural and non-agricultural products; Xwri4 and Xwri5 denote 
the Mexican production of corn and sorghum, respectively; and Xwri6 is the constant.   
 The  variable  Zwri1 denotes the news on producer pressure and Zwri2 - Zwri7 denote industry 
allocations of import permits starting with the corn flour industry, the tortilla industry, the starch 
industry, the livestock industry, CONASUPO, and the cereal industry.  Lagged variables for 
protection are also added.  It is assumed that having an import permit last month will have an 
effect on import demand for this month.  Therefore, Zwri8 is lagged producer pressure, Zwri9 is 
lagged import permit allocation to the livestock industry, Zwri10 is lagged import permit allocation 
to the cereal industry, Zwri11 is lagged import permit allocation to the corn flour industry, Zwri12 is 
lagged import permit allocation to CONASUPO, Zwri13 is lagged import permit allocation to the 
tortilla industry, and Zwri14 is lagged import permit allocation to the starch industry   
Hypothesis Tests 
  The single null hypothesis Ho: βi=0 is tested using an asymptotic z-value.  A joint null 
hypothesis Ho: βi, βj =0 is tested using a likelihood ratio test statistic that is asymptotically chi-
squared distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameter restrictions 
(Griffiths et al 1993). 
  The import demands for white corn, yellow corn, and sorghum are a function of prices, 
production variables, and political variables.  One can state a priori what the expected effects of 
the price and production variables will be on the quantity demanded of corn and sorghum.  
According to the marginal effects in the next section one would expect that as the supply of   21 
protection increases, import demand decreases and that as the demand for protection decreases, 
import demand increases.  
  One would expect that if yellow corn and sorghum are being imported that the quantity 
imported of white corn will also increase.  If total imports increases then the one would expect 
that imports of white corn will also increase.  One expects that the domestic production of corn 
and sorghum will have a negative effect on the import demand for white corn.  One also expects 
that if the price of yellow corn increases the import demand for white corn will decrease since 
white corn price is at a premium to yellow corn price.  If the tortilla industry increases its 
lobbying efforts one would expect that the import demand for white corn will increase.  In 
contrast, if the starch industry increases its lobbying efforts one would expect that the import 
demand for white corn will decrease.  Also, if the cereal industry receives an import permit one 
would expect that the import demand for white corn will increase and if producer pressure 
increases then import demand for white corn will decrease.   
  When import demand for yellow corn is the dependent variable and the imports of white 
corn increase, one expects that yellow corn imports will also increase.  In contrast, if the imports 
of sorghum increase it is expected that the import demand for yellow corn will decrease since 
yellow corn and sorghum are substitutes.  Total imports are expected to have a positive effect on 
the import demand for yellow corn.  If the production of corn increases one expects that the 
import demand for yellow corn will decrease and as the production of sorghum increases one 
expects that the import demand for yellow corn will also decrease.  As the price for yellow corn 
increases the import demand for yellow corn should decrease, following the law of demand.  One 
expects that if the prices of white corn and sorghum increase that the import demand for yellow   22 
corn will increase.  If the yellow corn importing industries (i.e. starch and livestock industries) 
receive import permits then it is expected that import demand for yellow corn will increase.  
However, if the tortilla, cereal, corn flour, and CONASUPO receive import permits then import 
demand for yellow corn should decrease as they will want import permits for white corn not 
yellow corn.  Import demand will also decrease if producer pressure decreases. 
  When estimating the import demand for sorghum, one expects that as the import of white 
corn and yellow corn increase that the imports of sorghum increase.  One also expects that if 
total imports increase then imports of sorghum will also increase.  In contrast, it is expected that 
if the production of corn and sorghum increase then the import demand for sorghum will 
decrease.  It is expected that if the price of sorghum increases then the import demand for 
sorghum will decrease and if the price of corn increases, then the import demand for sorghum 
should also increase.  One would expect that if the starch and livestock industries receive import 
permits that import demand for sorghum will decrease.  If the livestock industry receives import 
permits for corn they will not import sorghum unless the price of sorghum is low enough to 
make up for the difference in protein.  If producer pressure to halt imports increases then one 
would expect that import demand for sorghum will decrease.   
Marginal Effects  
  In equation (7), import demand for white corn is a function, among others, of import 
prices and quantities, production variables, and political factors.  The same is true for the import 
demand of yellow corn and sorghum.  In this section changes in these variables and their a priori 
affect on import demand are discussed.     23 
  According to public choice literature different industries will lobby for and against import 
protection depending on whether they consumers of a products or producers of a product.  
Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) show how different 
industries form a lobby to interact with the government in order to order to maximize protection.  
In this study each industry is its own lobby which seeks to increase or decrease the level of 
import protection.  The hypothesized results of these lobbying efforts are shown in the marginal 












where, ZTORT measures the lobbying effort by the tortilla industry.  Equation (17) shows how a 
change in the lobbying efforts by the tortilla industry will have a positive impact on the import 
demand for white corn.  In other words, if the tortilla industry increases its lobbying efforts to get 
more import permits issued, then the supply of protection will decrease and import demand will 












where ZSTCH measures the lobbying effort of the starch industry.  In equation (18) the opposite is 
true.  As the starch industry, which imports only yellow corn, increases its lobbying efforts to get 
import permits, the level of protection in the white corn market increases and that causes a 
decrease in the import demand for white corn.   However, as equation (19) shows it would cause 
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  An increase in the production of corn in Mexico would cause a decrease in the import 




























where MXMZ is production of corn in Mexico.  In other words, if the production of corn in 
Mexico increases there is less need for imports of corn.  Since sorghum is imported as a 
substitute for corn, then if corn is not imported, neither will sorghum be imported. 












where ZSUGAR measures the lobbying effort of sugar producers.  In the sorghum market, if the 
demand for protection from imports of yellow corn increases then the import demand for 
sorghum increases.  For example, in equation (23) if sugar producers increase their lobbying 
efforts so that the Mexican government decrease the amount of import permits given for yellow 
corn, then the industries that can substitute sorghum for yellow corn such as the livestock 
industry will increase their imports of sorghum.   25 
Results 
Smith-Blundell Exogeneity Tests 
  The Smith-Blundell exogeneity test results are analyzed and the estimated results for the 
import demand structural models with endogenous protection are presented.  The estimated 
results pertain to the simultaneous tobit models in equations (14)-(16) using monthly data for the 
period between January 1994 and December 2000.   
  In the white corn model the null hypothesis is that the yellow corn residual coefficient 
and the sorghum residual coefficient, estimates of α1 and α2, respectively, will be zero.  In other 
words, that yellow corn and sorghum are weakly exogenous in the white corn import demand 
model.  The t-statistic for the yellow corn residuals is 0.171 and the t-statistic for the sorghum 
residuals is 0.079. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity.  Therefore, 
yellow corn inspections and sorghum inspections are not jointly determined with white corn 
inspections.   
  The null hypothesis for the yellow corn model is that the white corn and sorghum 
residuals coefficients are zero.  The t-statistic for white corn residuals is -0.010 and the t-statistic 
for sorghum residuals is 0.084.  The results indicate that neither white corn residuals nor 
sorghum residuals are statistically significant from zero so we fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
weak exogeneity.  This indicates that yellow corn export inspections are not jointly determined 
with white corn or sorghum inspections.   
  The null hypothesis for the sorghum import demand model is that the white corn and 
yellow corn residual coefficients are zero.  The t-statistics for white corn and yellow corn 
residuals are -0.013 and -0.017, respectively.  Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that   26 
the coefficients are statistically significant from zero.  In other words we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that white corn inspections and yellow corn inspections are weakly exogenous in the 
sorghum import demand model.   Hence, according to the results sorghum inspections are not 
jointly determined with white corn inspections or yellow corn inspections.     
Model Results  
  In this section the estimated results for equations (14)-(16) are interpreted.  These are 
import demand structural models with demand for protection estimated simultaneously.  The 
import demand models were estimated using a tobit model and monthly data from January 1994 
to December 2000.   
White Corn   
  The parameter estimates, standard errors, and p-values are presented in Table 4 and 
marginal effects are presented in Table 5.  Yellow corn and sorghum imports are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  Mexican production of sorghum is statistically significant at the 10% 
level.  Import permit allocations to CONASUPO and the tortilla and starch industries are 
statistically significant at the 1%, 10%, and 5% levels, respectively.   
  The estimated results from the model provide some interesting insights into the import 
demand for white corn.  For example, the results indicate that if yellow corn or sorghum imports 
increase then the import demand for white corn will also increase.  Import permit allocation to 
the tortilla industry has a positive effect on the import demand for white corn.  In contrast the 
import permit allocation to the starch industry has a negative effect on the import demand for 
white corn.  CONASUPO, the government agency that imports white corn for the small tortilla 
makers and its own distribution centers has a positive effect on white corn import demand.    27 
Mexican production of sorghum has a negative effect on the import demand for white corn.  The 
prices of white corn, yellow corn, and sorghum are not statistically significant indicating that 
prices do not drive the import demand for white corn.  The results indicate that what drives 
import demand for white corn are the importing industries and imports of yellow corn and 
sorghum.   
Yellow corn 
  The parameter estimates, standard errors, and p-values are provided in Table 6 for the 
yellow corn import demand model.  Marginal effects are presented in Table 7.  White corn 
imports and total (agricultural and non-agricultural) imports are statistically significant at the 1% 
and 5% levels, respectively.  Mexican production of sorghum is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  Import permit allocations to CONASUPO and the starch industry are statistically 
significant at the 10% level and the cereal industry receiving import permits is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  The price of yellow corn and the price of sorghum are statistically 
significant at the 1% level and the price of white corn is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Import permits issued to CONASUPO and to the corn flour industry in the previous period are 
statistically significant at the 10%.         
  The estimated coefficient for white corn imports has a positive effect on yellow corn 
import demand while sorghum imports have a negative affect.  Total imports have a negative 
effect on the import demand for yellow corn.  This would indicate that as imports from the U.S. 
increase there is a decrease in the import demand for yellow corn (i.e. less imports allowed).  
Hence, as stated by Trefler (1993), increased import penetration increases import protection.  
The production of sorghum in Mexico also has a positive effect on the import demand for yellow   28 
corn.  The import permit allocations to the starch industry and CONASUPO have a positive 
effect on the import demand for yellow corn.  The cereal industry receiving import permits has a 
negative effect on the import demand for yellow corn.   
  The cash price of yellow corn is negative indicating that as price increases quantity 
demanded decreases.  In other words, as the price of yellow corn increases the demand for 
yellow corn decreases.  The price of sorghum and the price for white corn have a positive effect 
on the import demand for yellow corn.  Therefore, as the price of white corn or sorghum 
increases the import demand for yellow corn also increases.  This indicates that sorghum and 
white corn are substitutes for yellow corn.   
  Import permit allocation to the corn flour industry in the previous period has a positive 
effect on the import demand for yellow corn.  In contrast, import permit allocation in the 
previous period to CONASUPO has a negative effect on import demand in the current period.   
Sorghum 
  The results for the import demand for sorghum with endogenous protection are shown in 
Table 8 and marginal effects are presented in Table 9.  The table provides the parameter 
estimates, standard errors, and p-values.  White corn imports are statistically significant at the 
1% level.  Producer pressure and import permits issued to CONASUPO are statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  The price of sorghum is statistically significant at the 1% level even 
as the price of white corn and yellow corn are statistically significant at the 10% and 1% levels, 
respectively.   
   The cash price of sorghum is negative as expected from the law of demand indicating 
that as the price of sorghum increases the import demand for sorghum decreases.  The quantity   29 
of white corn imported is positive therefore, as the quantity of white corn imports increases so 
does the import demand for sorghum.  An increase in the price of yellow corn will increase the 
import demand for sorghum as expected with substitutes.  Producer pressure has a negative 
effect on sorghum import demand.  Therefore, if producer pressure increases then import 
demand for sorghum decreases.  Import permits issued to CONASUPO have a negative effect on 
the import demand for sorghum.  Import permits issued to the livestock industry in the previous 
period has a negative effect on the import demand for sorghum.  If the livestock industry has an 
import permit then it will not need to import sorghum when it can import corn. 
Import Price Simulations 
  Expected import prices for the monthly structural models were found using the parameter 
values and the predicted probabilities from the white corn, yellow corn, and sorghum tobit 
models in equations (14)-(16).  The expected import prices were constructed for each month 
from January 1994 to December 2000.  Figure 4 through Figure 6 show the expected import 
price and the actual export price.  The difference between the two prices is the marketing margin 
associated with the import permit.  The average import price for white corn over the sample time 
period is $121.90 and the average import prices for yellow corn and sorghum are $101.50 and 
110.94, respectively.  The average marketing margins for white corn, yellow corn, and sorghum 
are $5.40, $5.53, and $25.07, respectively.   
Conclusions 
  This study specified a conceptual structural model of international marketing margins and 
trade uncertainty that links the private market to political factors influencing administrative trade 
barriers.  In doing so, this systematically links trade models specified by Gallagher (1998) and   30 
others, which characterize private markets under uncertainty but ignore direct influences from 
political markets, to work by Trefler (1993) and others, which focus on endogenous trade 
protection.  Behavioral processes that determine the likelihood of trade are identified using 
concepts of trade protection and public choice analysis.  The intent was to provide a trade model 
with endogenous protection that can help explain uncertainty in trade of agricultural 
commodities due to technical trade barriers.  This provided a framework to identify factors that 
determine the likelihood of issuing import permits for corn exported from the U.S. to Mexico 
and to determine its impact on international marketing margins.   
  Mexican import demand models are estimated simultaneously with the demand for 
protection using an instrumental variables approach used by Zellner (1970) when estimating 
regression relationships with unobservable independent variables.  In this case import demand 
equations are estimated using simultaneous tobit model with monthly data from January 1994 to 
December 2000.  Some interesting insights are provided by the import demand structural models 
with endogenous protection.  Producer pressure has a negative affect on the import demand for 
corn and sorghum although it is only statistically significant for the import demand for sorghum.  
The results are consistent with public choice analysis which indicates that increased import 
penetration will increase lobbying efforts from domestic firms to decrease imports.  The results 
indicate that as grain producers lobby for a decrease in import permit allocation the import 
demand for these grains decreases, meaning that they have succeeded in their efforts to reduce 
import competition.  Marketing margins associated with the corn import permit range form $5 
for corn and $25 for sorghum.  An interesting insight is that although the import permit restricts 
corn imports, sorghum import prices are also affected and an administrative trade barrier has also   31 
been captured for that commodity.  A conclusion drawn from the results is that trade uncertainty 
caused higher prices in the import market.   
  The removal of the import permit in Mexico would increase U.S. exports to Mexico.  
This leads us to believe that the import permit regime in Mexico is having a detrimental affect on 
U.S. exports of corn to Mexico.  Without the import permit, the U.S. would expect a higher 
demand for corn from Mexico since prices would no longer be kept artificially high by the 
import permit.  Producers in the U.S. would be better able to predict not only when Mexican 
importers would come into the market but also write long term contracts.   
  It is apparent that this research has practical implications.  One could forecast the effect a 
possible change in policy, be it political or macroeconomic, might have on the import price.  
Underlying the model is the fundamental idea that one is linking political and private market 
processes to better understand the implications of administrative trade barriers.  Conceptually 
and empirically this methodology could be extended to other commodities and other countries 
that have administrative trade barriers in place, such as the U.S. sugary policy or the E.U. 
hormone treated beef policy. 
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Table 1 Abbreviations for Monthly Data 
YCORN  Quantity of U.S. yellow corn inspected for export to Mexico in metric tons. 
WCORN  Quantity of U.S. white corn inspected for export to Mexico in metric tons. 
SORG    Quantity of U.S. sorghum inspected for export to Mexico in metric tons. 
TTLEXP  Total agricultural and non-agricultural export from U.S. to Mexico in million metric tons. 
MXMZ   Total production of corn in Mexico in metric tons 
MXSG   Total production of sorghum in Mexico in metric tons. 
NEWS   News articles detailing producer protests against imports of corn 
CPYC    Yellow corn cash price in U.S. dollars (USD) per metric ton. 
CPSG    Sorghum cash price in USD per metric ton. 
CPWC   White corn cash price in USD per metric ton.   
FLOUR  Import permit allocation to the corn flour industry: 0=no, 1=yes. 
TORT    Import permit allocation to the tortilla industry: 0=no, 1=yes. 
STCH    Import permit allocation to the starch industry: 0=no, 1=yes. 
LIVE    Import permit allocation to the livestock industry: 0=no, 1=yes. 
SUPO    Import permit allocation to CONASUPO: 0=no, 1=yes. 
CEREAL  Import permit allocation to the cereal industry: 0=no, 1=yes. 
LNEWS  News articles detailing producer protests against imports of corn in the previous period 
(t-1). 
LFLOUR  Import permit allocation to the corn flour industry in t-1. 
LTORT   Import permit allocation to the tortilla industry in t-1. 
LSTCH   Import permit allocation to the starch industry in t-1. 
LLIVE   Import permit allocation to the livestock industry in t-1. 
LSUPO   Import permit allocation to CONASUPO in t-1. 
LCEREAL  Import permit allocation to the cereal industry in t-1. 
 EXRT   USD to Peso conversion rate. 
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 Table 2 Monthly Data Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum  Observations 
MNTH 6.5000 3.4728  1.00  12.00  84 
YCORN 264894.092  167057.856  0.00  677152.390  84 
WCORN 47217.0992  51838.9869  0.00  255691.200  84 
SORG 169989.965  102399.647 0.00  472086.320  84 
TTLEXP 5980.3119  1861.9859  3382.500  10448.800  84 
MXCRN 1516094.81  1245618.05  0.00  3075785.00  84 
MXSG 457494.823  88947.4255  308426.670  567457.500  84 
NEWS 1.5833  2.0780  0.00  8.00  84 
STARCH 0.7500  0.4356  0.00  1.00  84 
LIVESTOCK 0.5952  0.4938  0.00  1.00  84 
CEREAL 0.5119  0.5029  0.00  1.00  84 
CORN FLR  0.6548  0.4783  0.00  1.00  84 
CONASUPO 0.3571  0.4820  0.00  1.00  84 
TORTILLA 0.4405  0.4994  0.00  1.00  84 
FPRICE 104.209 24.2158  70.68  188.97  84 
CPYC 95.9781  24.3395 59.84 174.40  84 
CPSG 85.0348  23.7567 53.36 162.63  84 
CPWC 116.5033  29.9183  72.63  211.69  84 
EXRT 0.1477  0.0645  0.1002  0.3220  84 
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Table 3 OLS Results for White Corn Cash Price 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  T-ratio 
Cash Price Ycorn  1.2138  0.0166  73.008* 
*Statistically Significant at the 1% level 
R
2 = 0.755 
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Table 4 Mexican Import Demand for White Corn with Endogenous Protection 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  P[|Z|>z] 
Linear Trend  -829.1422  2450.6067  0.7351 
Quadratic Trend  3.1659  23.7132  0.8939 
YCORN (metric ton)  0.1441***  0.0353  0.0000 
SORG (metric ton)  0.2016***  0.0669  0.0026 
TTLEXP (metric ton)  14.0373  10.6995  0.1895 
MXMZ (metric ton)  -0.0008  0.0041  0.9849 
MXSG (metric ton)  -0.2112*  0.1267  0.0956 
NEWS (# of articles)  -500.176  2925.8800  0.8643 
FLOUR (1=yes,0=no)  17430.7541  17089.422  0.3077 
TORT (1=yes,0=no)  20757.2765*  11328.159  0.0669 
STCH (1=yes,0=no)  -42946.7609**  17063.804  0.0118 
LIVE (1=yes,0=no)  15834.9561  15131.808  0.2935 
SUPO (1=yes,0=no)   36704.94712***  12172.549  0.0026 
CEREAL (1=yes,0=no)  4859.6716  15361.010  0.7517 
CPWC (Peso/MT)  6852.4405  10416.015  0.5106 
CPYC (Peso/MT)  -4041.6612  15514.733  0.7945 
CPSG (Peso/MT)  -6853.5395  6778.0766  0.3120 
LNEWS(1=yes,0=no)   2770.3754  4953.7948  0.5760 
LSTCH (1=yes,0=no)  33419.0378  31697.671  0.2917 
LLIVE (1=yes,0=no)  -24941.4931  33139.612  0.4517 
LCEREAL (1=yes,0=no)  21870.4834  28712.044  0.4462 
LFLOUR (1=yes,0=no)  -46044.5486  39335.579  0.2418 
LSUPO (1=yes,0=no)  31252.6749  31203.706  0.3166 
LTORT (1=yes,0=no)  -18328.3569  22246.428  0.4100 
Constant 24533.9111  61973.135  0.6922 
*** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
** Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level 
* Indicates statistically significant at the 10% level 
 Log Likelihood = -820.3907 Restricted Log Likelihood -1030.5833 
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Table 5 Import Demand for White Corn with Endogenous Protection Marginal Effects 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  P[|Z|>z] 
Linear Trend  -729.1813  2153.7052  0.7349 
Quadratic Trend  2.7842  20.8461  0.8938 
YCORN (metric ton)  0.1268***  0.0310  0.0000 
SORG (metric ton)  0.1773***  0.0587  0.0025 
TTLEXP (metric ton)  12.3450  9.4522  0.1915 
MXMZ (metric ton)  -0.0007  0.0041  0.9849 
MXSG (metric ton)  0.1744  0.1069  0.1027 
NEWS (# of articles)  -439.8754  2573.3248  0.8643 
CPWC (Peso/MT)  6026.3144  9169.2195  0.5110 
CPYC (Peso/MT)  -3554.4013  13648.893  0.7945 
CPSG (Peso/MT)  -6027.2809  5958.8066  0.3118 
Constant 21576.1176  54515.886  0.6923 
LNEWS (# of articles)  2436.3086  4360.2778  0.5763 
*** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level  
Marginal effects are calculated at the mean  37 
Table 6 Mexican Import Demand for Yellow Corn with Endogenous Protection 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  P[|Z|>z] 
Linear Trend  6107.9850  6842.0677  0.3720 
Quadratic Trend  -7.7827  64.8379  0.9045 
WCORN (metric ton)  1.3613***  0.3402  0.0001 
SORG (metric ton)  -0.01933  0.1998  0.9229 
TTLEXP (metric ton)  -66.0449**  29.5573  0.0255 
MXMZ (metric ton)  -0.0043  0.0119  0.7145 
MXSG (metric ton)  1.0343***  0.3340  0.0020 
NEWS (# of articles)  5304.2964  8268.1109  0.5212 
FLOUR (1=yes,0=no)  -29050.4558  48196.9080  0.5467 
TORT (1=yes,0=no)  -27843.1388  35520.970  0.4331 
STCH (1=yes,0=no)  88284.5074*  49160.383  0.0725 
LIVE (1=yes,0=no)  31295.8766  44416.180  0.4811 
SUPO (1=yes,0=no)   78003.1386*  47383.751  0.0997 
CEREAL (1=yes,0=no)  -129955.9037***  42303.033  0.0021 
CPWC (Peso/MT)  60268.6929**  29242.355  0.0393 
CPYC (Peso/MT)  -132253.5260***  41918.040  0.0016 
CPSG (Peso/MT)  75141.6411***  17455.557  0.0000 
LNEWS(1=yes,0=no)   -15053.8047  13942.820  0.2803 
LSTCH (1=yes,0=no)  12718.5010  90468.787  0.8882 
LLIVE (1=yes,0=no)  68210.1332  97129.149  0.4825 
LCEREAL (1=yes,0=no)  -90147.0965  82986.866  0.2774 
LFLOUR (1=yes,0=no)  208618.6885**  105931.980  0.0489 
LSUPO (1=yes,0=no)  -161061.0593*  85482.0224  0.0595 
LTORT (1=yes,0=no)  -7555.0026  65027.557  0.9075 
Constant -267563.3304  167412.67  0.1100 
*** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
** Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level 
* Indicates statistically significant at the 10% level 
Log Likelihood = -1077.328  Restricted Log Likelihood = 1128.8799 
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Table 7 Import Demand for Yellow Corn with Endogenous Protection Marginal Effects 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  P[|Z|>z] 
Linear Trend  4763.5376  8381.1804  0.5698 
Quadratic Trend  -6.0696  51.0039  0.9053 
YCORN (metric ton)  1.6016  1.4855  0.4748 
SORG (metric ton)  -0.0151  0.1579  0.9239 
TTLEXP (metric ton)  -51.5075  75.0434  0.4925 
MXMZ (metric ton)  -0.0034  0.0105  0.7474 
MXSG (metric ton)  0.8067  1.1412  0.4797 
NEWS (# of articles)  4136.7513  8637.2215  0.6320 
CPWC (Peso/MT)  47002.7646  68777.229  0.4944 
CPYC (Peso/MT)  -103142.7935  144884.65  0.4765 
CPSG (Peso/MT)  58601.9822  80693.167  0.4677 
Constant -208669.1385  309294.22  0.4999 
LNEWS (# of articles)  -11740.2652  20640.107  0.5695 
Marginal effects are calculated at the mean.  39 
Table 8 Mexican Import Demand for Sorghum with Endogenous Protection 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  P[|Z|>z] 
Linear Trend  2376.4478  3607.9199  0.5101 
Quadratic Trend  16.7176  33.5474  0.6183 
WCORN (metric ton)  0.5919***  0.1961  0.0025 
YCORN (metric ton)  -0.0155  0.05816  0.7900 
TTLEXP (metric ton)  -1.3849 15.2564 0.9277 
MXMZ (metric ton)  -0.0045 0.0065  0.4929 
MXSG (metric ton)  -0.1587 0.1916  0.4076 
NEWS (# of articles)  -7996.8152* 4281.2792  0.0618 
FLOUR (1=yes,0=no)  7998.7981 25623.666 0.7549 
TORT (1=yes,0=no)  2363.6919 18594.973 0.8988 
STCH (1=yes,0=no)  -11046.9044 24509.678  0.6522 
LIVE (1=yes,0=no)  -26851.3257 21886.985  0.2199 
SUPO (1=yes,0=no)   -34196.2465* 19049.761  0.0726 
CEREAL (1=yes,0=no)  36160.0582 22847.933  0.1135 
CPWC (Peso/MT)  -17963.6759 15282.893  0.2744 
CPYC (Peso/MT)  52291.8475** 23810.466  0.0281 
CPSG (Peso/MT)  -26711.9555*** 10213.847  0.0089 
Constant -35712.9439  94288.193  0.7049 
LNEWS (# of articles)  -517.7834 7687.3647 0.9463 
LSTCH (1=yes,0=no)  -15270.4938 49668.066  0.7585 
LLIVE (1=yes,0=no)  -94821.0443* 52656.927  0.0717 
LCEREAL (1=yes,0=no)  17652.9390 46079.732  0.7016 
LFLOUR (1=yes,0=no)  71164.7297 59311.357  0.2302 
LSUPO (1=yes,0=no)  -12835.2452 47487.155  0.7869 
LTORT (1=yes,0=no)  34570.7203 35307.322  0.3275 
*** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
**Indicates statistically significant at 5% level 
* Indicates statistically significant at the 10% level 
Log Likelihood = -1029.295  Restricted Log Likelihood = -1087.7655   40 
Table 9 Import Demand for Sorghum with Endogenous Protection Marginal Effects 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  P[|Z|>z] 
Linear Trend  2653.7407  3787.5438  0.4835 
Quadratic Trend  3.2183  35.7299  0.9282 
WCORN (metric ton)  0.5453***  0.1959  0.0054 
YCORN (metric ton)  -0.0077  0.0605  0.8989 
TTLEXP (metric ton)  6.6598  16.7555  0.6910 
MXMZ (metric ton)  -0.0062  0.0065  0.3435 
MXSG (metric ton)  -0.1044  0.1941  0.5906 
NEWS (# of articles)  -5641.6788  4536.3163  0.2136 
CPWC (Peso/MT)  -17933.2053  16406.692  0.2744 
CPYC (Peso/MT)  52203.1484**  23770.073  0.0281 
CPSG (Peso/MT)  -26666.6458***  10196.774  0.0089 
Constant -35652.3664  94126.070  0.7049 
LNEWS (# of articles)  -516.9051  7674.3293  0.9463 
***Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
**Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level 
Marginal effects are calculated at the mean.  41
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